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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
A DIPLOMATS ECONOMICS FALLS SHORT:
LESSONS FOR DEVELOPMENT FROM THE
URUGUAY ROUND
DR. J. MICHAEL FINGER*
Thank you very much for your kind invitation to speak to you
today. Thanks particularly to Dean Bellacosa, Judge Carman,
Judge Re, who are with us here in this room. If we look up
toward heaven we can thank Judge DeCarlo as well. I
compliment you on the spirit of family that you have nurtured
here, I am sure it is an important part of the educational
experience at St. John's.
Conferences such as this one are more than educational, they
J. Michael Finger is a resident fellow at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research (AEI) studying international trade policy, development, and the GATT/WTO
system. He previously held the position of lead economist for the trade policy research
group at the World Bank. He has served on the faculties of the University of Bern,
Stockholm School of Economics, and Duke University. He has worked as an economist at
the Treasury Department, the United Nations, and the U.S. Tariff Commission. His books
include Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt The Uruguay Round: A
Handbook; and more recently, Institutions and Trade Policy.
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are fun. A good conference should go beyond answering the
question it addresses, it should identify an issue for a next
conference. I will leave the other speakers to resolve the issue of
"Globalization's Impact on International Trade and Intellectual
Property Law." In my few minutes I would like to call your
attention to another problem. To me, the Uruguay Round'
outcome is troubling because it suggests that the GATT/WTO2
system has taken on more than its economics can chew. I will
point to some grave mistakes we made at the Uruguay Round, I
will however offer no solution other than the obvious one: "Do not
make the same mistakes at the next round of negotiations."
Unlike the previous rounds of trade negotiations since World
War II, the Uruguay Round had economic losers. Previous
rounds were principally about reducing tariffs. Mercantilist
economics and the process of reciprocal negotiations treats
reduction of a tariff as a "concession" to be given only if other
countries provide reciprocal concessions. But in real economics,
removing a tariff leads to resources being more efficiently used in
both the importing and the exporting country; when the policy
action is to reduce tariffs both the exporting country and the
importing country are winners. Within each country there will
be winners and losers, but the gains will be larger than the
losses. The argument for free trade is not that it helps everyone;
it is that in each country it helps more than it hurts. Free trade
may be politically incorrect, but its economics are impeccable.
Why did the failure to distinguish the real economics from the
mercantilist economics matter at the Uruguay Round when it did
not matter at earlier rounds? Because the Uruguay Round moved
on from tariff liberalization to issues that demand a more
sophisticated economics. The "grand bargain," as Sylvia Ostry
has labeled it,3 struck at the Uruguay Round was that the
I See generally GATT's Uruguay Round, Blink for God's Sake, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
31, 1992, at 70 (referring to the 1986 conference round on international trade, held under
the auspices of the earlier General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which
established the World Trade Organization (WTO)).
2 Refers to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was first
signed in 1947 and later evolved into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 at the
close of the Uruguay Round. As of April, 2003, the WTO has 146 member states, which
seek to trade internationally under a rule of law. More information can be found at the
website of the World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
3 SYLVIA OSTRY, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for
Future Negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 285-300
(Daniel M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge,
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developing countries would take on significant commitments in
"new areas," particularly intellectual property.
On one side, the bargain would deal with lax copyright and
patent enforcement in developing countries. If these countries
could be held to a higher standard, developed country owners of
intellectual property could collect royalties on intellectual
property that are now being "pirated."4 The developed countries,
in exchange, would open up in areas of particular export interest
to developing countries: agriculture and textiles/clothing.
As to finally taking on textiles/clothing, from the beginning of
the GATT negotiations the textiles industry in the United States
and Europe had been able to fight off significant reductions of the
tariffs that protected them. Moreover, in the 1960s the
industry's political influence was so strong that it had forced the
negotiation of special international regime for imports of textiles
and clothing.5 This regime, though a part of the GATT, was
created not to facilitate reduction of import restrictions, but to
sanction the continuing existence of import restrictions. Initially
it covered only cotton products, it came in time to include all
textiles - it became the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA).6 (Its
origins lie in the power the "seniority system" under which
Southern members controlled the U.S. Congress.) The MFA
2002) (referring to the concessions that are bargained for at the trade negotiations, where
a nation will agree to alter one aspect of their market economy in exchange for a
conciliatory alteration by another nation).
4 Services was the other major "new area." I will not take up services here because
the North-South economics of the new areas is dominated by intellectual property.
5 After World War II, the developing countries that benefited from access to raw
materials and relatively low production costs, especially wages, rapidly increased the
volume of exports of cotton textiles and clothing to the U.S. and other developed country
markets. This sharp increase in low value imports of cotton textiles hampered investment
and employment in the developed countries, which faced the prospect of closure of
production facilities (i.e., Southern U.S.) leading to serious social problems. To counter the
problem, some developed countries negotiated agreements with individual governments
that would limit the quantities of exports of cotton textiles. More information can be
found at the website of the World Trade Organization, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/eol/e/wto02/wto2_28.htm (last visited Apr.
12, 2003).
6 First put into effect in 1974, The Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) established import
and export quotas for textiles. The MFA is a framework agreement, established by GATT,
used by most of the world, which allowed participating states to establish restrictions on
the importation of textiles on a country-by-country basis contrary to the GATT's most-
favored-nation rule. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (Uruguay
Round) requires that these agreements be phased out. More information can be found at
the website of the World Trade Organization, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_elwhatis_eleol/e/wtoO2/wte2-28.htm (last visited Apr.
12, 2003).
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sanctioned a widespread system of import quotas - I will take up
later the important difference between import protection by
import quotas rather than tariffs.
The second sector that had evaded the GATT-facilitated
reduction of trade restrictions was agriculture. Here, the
protection was more complicated than simple tariffs as well.
Each industrial country has in place an extensive system of
production supports and subsidies. Import restrictions serve to
protect not just agricultural production, but the agricultural
support programs themselves. If imports could come in freely, it
would be impossible to maintain, in the US or any other country,
the higher prices that the agricultural support programs require.
Particularly in Europe, governmental support for agricultural
production was sufficient enough that agricultural production
actually exceeded consumption. The surplus of production over
consumption was sold on world markets, the effect being to drive
down world prices for agricultural products as domestic support
programs kept prices high internally.
In mercantilist economics, this sounds like a balanced deal:
developed countries give on textiles and agriculture, developing
countries offer market opportunities in services and intellectual
property.
But the real economics of the deal is quite unbalanced for
several reasons. For one, the obligations created to pay royalties
on intellectual property dwarf the economics of the other parts of
the package. For China, Korea and Mexico, for example, the
obligations to pay royalties and copyrights created by the
agreement on intellectual property are several times larger than
the benefits of the liberalization of trade in industrial goods they
will receive in exchange. 7
Another reason, the economics of removing import quotas (the
MFA-sanctioned restrictions on imports of textiles/clothing from
developing countries) is different from the economics of tariff
reduction. The major economic impact of a quota on the amount
an exporter can ship is to maintain a higher price for the
exporter. It is the same as the economics of an OPEC oil price
increase; importers pay more for the same amount. A tariff that
7 Figures are given in J. Michael Finger, Implementing the Uruguay Round
Agreements: Problems for Developing Countries, 24 THE WORLD ECON. 1097-1108 (2001).
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reduces imports to the same level would have the same efficiency
effects but would avoid providing the exporter the windfall gain
from a higher price. Consumers would pay a higher price, but
the windfall would be taken away from the exporter in the form
of tariff revenue - a transfer of wealth from consumers to the
government, but not a loss to the country as a whole.
Removing an import quota will provide efficiency gains for both
exporters and importers. Elimination of the transfer of wealth
from the importer to the exporter will be an additional gain for
the importer, but a loss for the exporter. Indeed, for many
exporters of textiles/clothing the loss of the windfall gain from
the quota is larger than the efficiency gain. Reliable analysis
indicates that countries such as Korea and Taiwan who now
enjoy protected access to U.S. and European market will be
worse off after the MFA is removed.8
I know turn to agriculture. As I sketched above, agriculture
programs in the developed countries lead to overproduction, the
overproduction leads to the surplus being dumped on world
markets, or sold under special programs to poor countries. For
producers in other countries this is unfair competition, for
consumers it is cheap food - whether through programs to donate
such food or through the mechanism of the market price being
pushed down when the overproduction is dumped. Getting rid of
agricultural programs in the North will provide major benefits to
the North, but it will deprive some of cheap food in the South.
Much of Sub-Saharan Africa has a larger interest in this issue as
a consumer than as a producer, the agricultural reform agreed at
the Uruguay Round will bring them greater costs than benefits. 9
At the Uruguay Round, the international community stepped
forward to address problems of legal structure. They created a
formal organization, the World Trade Organization, to
administer the several trade agreements that were concluded.
(Many of them were elaborations of previous agreements.) The
also created a formal dispute settlement mechanism to replace
the ad hoc system that had evolved over the fifty years of the
8 Glenn W. Harrison, et al., Quantiljyig the Uruguay Round, 107 ECON. J. 1405-1430
(1997) (noting that the elimination of trade barriers will result in increased competition to
nations that have more beneficial economies of scale).
9 Id. (explaining that nations in Africa will derive no benefit from decreased
competition, rather they rely on the cheap prices resulting from "dumping," as well as
charitable food contributions from nations like the U.S.).
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GATT.
At the Uruguay Round we got the jurisprudence right but we
got the economics wrong. The next challenge is to find a way to
bring into play a system of economic analysis sufficient to
manage the economic issues the organization has taken on. The
simple economics inherited from a simpler day, when the major
economic challenge trade negotiations faces was to reduce tariffs,
is not good enough. Diplomacy is more fun, but sometimes you
have to get out the accounts and run the numbers. There is little
in the early stages of the Doha NegotiationslO (launched in
November 2001) to suggest that the WTO community has yet
realized that it must come to grips with this challenge, but it
must. Economics cannot serve the function of jurisprudence.
Likewise, jurisprudence cannot serve the function of economics.
The challenge now is to shape the legal structure in a way that
better identifies the economic issues at play, and that provides
the possibility of reaching an outcome in which each country is
indeed an economic, not just a diplomatic, winner.
10 From November 9 to 14, 2001, the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, the latest
round of trade talks among WTO members, was held in Doha, Qatar. Information
regarding the conference can be found at http:/! www.wto.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
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